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This paper looks back on the evolution of institutional frameworks for economic 
integration in East Asia, which accelerated after the Asian financial crisis, analyzes 
its dynamics and future prospects, and identifies Japan’s roles in the process that 
are consistent with the institutional transformation of its economy and society as 
well as the fundamental interests the United States have in Asian integration and 
constructive roles it can play in the process.  In Section I, it analyzes the forces 
influencing the development and performance of various regional frameworks.  In 
Section II, the paper assesses the prospects for Asian economic integration in light of 
these forces as well as perceived obstacles.  Section III examines the  link between 
Japan’s policy efforts to overcome economic and political challenges, and the 
development of various institutional frameworks for East Asian economic integration.  
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East Asian economies, long known to be ambivalent toward regional integration, are 
dramatically changing their ways.  This new approach began in the late 1990s.1  Since 
1998, East Asian capitals have actively explored the possibilities of various bilateral free 
trade agreements (FTAs), while, in late 2001, the East Asia Vision Group reported to the 
leaders of ASEAN + 3 (grouping the  ten Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
members, plus China, Japan and South Korea) meeting on the vision of “an East Asian 
Community.”  The current situation can be characterized as “talking regional, acting 
bilateral”, a reflection of competitive impulses as well as pragmatism for steady progress.  
These important developments have major implications for both Japan and the United 
States.  This paper analyzes the dynamics of East Asian economic integration and its 
future prospects, Japan’s role in the process, and  how  the U nited  States can 
constructively influence the process. 
In the first section, this paper analyzes the forces influencing the development and 
performance of various regional frameworks.  Second, the paper assesses the prospects 
for Asian economic integration in light of these forces as well as perceived obstacles.  The 
third section examines the link between Japan’s policy efforts to overcome economic and 
political challenges, and the development of various institutional frameworks for East 
Asian economic integration.  In the concluding section, this paper presents positive 




                                                   
1 On Japan’s situation when it started considering bilateral FTAs and its policy thinking 
behind Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement, see Naoko Munakata, 
"Evolution of Japan's Policy Toward Economic Integration", CNAPS Working Paper, 
December 2001 
(http://www.brook.edu/fp/cnaps/papers/2001_munakata.htm)   3
I.  Underlying Forces: Drivers vs. Obstacles 
 
Driving Forces 
The pace of de facto economic integration in East Asia increased in the latter half of 
1980s.  East Asian capitals in late 1980s started to explore institutional frameworks to 
further promote economic integration in the region, cautiously at first, but then more 
actively toward the end of 1990s.  Three major driving forces have been at work.   
The first force was East Asian economies’ growing concern about regionalism gaining 
momentum particularly in Europe and North America after the end of the Cold War.  
Naturally, they had a desire to overcome differential treatment created by the European 
Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)(and eventually the 
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)) or other preferential agreements and to 
strengthen their negotiation leverage against these regional groups.  This force 
(henceforth referred to as “counter-regionalism factor”) has steadily strengthened over 
time as the trend toward regionalism expanded geographically as well as functionally.  
East Asian economies  thus  became more anxious to promote integration among 
themselves.   
Another force was East Asian frustration with unilateral approaches by the United 
States and “market fundamentalism” symbolized as “the Washington consensus.”  They 
felt the need for greater negotiation leverage vis-à-vis irreconcilable pressure from the 
United States and U.S.-dominated institutions.  This force (henceforth referred to as 
“leverage-seeking factor”) does not necessarily work constantly and tends to be driven by 
particular events, such as trade friction with Washington or initial mishandling of the 
Asian financial crisis.   
The third underlying factor was the region’s desire to have an effective mechanism 
for cooperation based on geographic proximity, de facto integration and challenges of   4
“compressed development” though rapid industrialization, and institutional transition 
to adapt to globalization.  They have an incentive to reduce transaction costs among 
neighbors where dense business networks  are already  in place, and to promote 
sustainable economic development.  This is a different experience from the process of 
European integration, which began as a result of shared geographic, cultural and 
political concerns.  In Europe, the economic reality of increased interdependence came 
later.  In East Asia, the partners for regional economic integration are based on intensity 
of economic interaction and less on geographic factors as in Europe.  Not all of 
geographic “East Asia” takes an active part in the economic integration process.  This 
force (henceforth referred to as “local economic factor”) has also strengthened over time.  
As de facto economic integration further deepened, and change was accelerated by 
globalization and technological progress, a stronger impetus for creating an effective 
local mechanism  (in addition to global institutions) to provide prompt and focused 
solutions to immediate regional problems was energized. 
 
Ambivalent Attitudes 
In spite of these forces, the path to creating an institutional framework in this region 
has never been straightforward. This is primarily because East Asian economies have 
always had ambivalent attitudes towards the process.   
First of all, East Asian economies are ambivalent towards each other.  On the one 
hand, there is a centripetal force driven by the three factors identified above that gives 
momentum to a pan-East Asian framework.  On the other hand, there is also centrifugal 
force driven by economic competition and political rivalry among regional powers, and a 
diversity in developmental stages, political systems and relations with countries outside 
the region.  This gives momentum to bilateral agreements in and outside the region or 
for a larger framework to diffuse tension among East Asian economies.  Until the Asian   5
financial crisis, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) played a central 
role in developing various regional fora as a benign mediator among regional powers.  In 
the late 1990s, Northeast Asian economies in turn started to explore ways to strengthen 
relationships among themselves on their own.    
Secondly, their attitude towards the United States, a global as well as an “Asia 
Pacific” power with a strong desire to open Asian markets, has also been ambivalent.  On 
the one hand, the “leverage-seeking factor” is at work, giving momentum to a pan-Asian 
framework.  On the other hand, they know that they need to anchor U.S. interests in the 
region since they need the U.S. security presence, U.S. technology and capital, and must 
accommodate their biggest customer.  When these considerations are emphasized, a 
pan-Asia Pacific framework or bilateral arrangements with the United States gain 
momentum.  U.S. policy has a large influence in which direction regional economies will 
tilt.  When U.S. policy accommodates East Asian common interests and demonstrates a 
strong commitment to regional stability and prosperity, momentum for Asian-only fora 
will likely decrease, and vice versa.  At the same time, the level of cooperation among 
East Asian economies affects their attitude towards the United States.  When there is no 
effective channel for cooperation among East Asian economies, they feel uncomfortable 
with a strong U.S. role that could “divide and rule”.  When East Asian economies are 
comfortable with the level of their internal cooperation, they tend to be more relaxed 
toward U.S. leadership. 
Thirdly, until late 1990s East Asian  countries were ambivalent a bout 
institutionalization itself.  While they appreciate problem solving, they exhibit inherent 
skepticism towards rigid, top-down institutions, and tend to prefer consensus building 
over confrontation.  They tend to avoid institutionalization and opt for easier, more 
flexible and (occasionally) less fundamental solutions.  On the other hand, when they are 
faced with serious regional problems that require effective solutions, institutionalization   6
will gain momentum, including legally binding agreements that constrain sovereignty 
and may have discriminatory effects vis-à-vis non-members.  As East Asian economies 
became more mature in dealing with regional frameworks and began to appreciate the 
efficacy of institutional agreements in giving political momentum to domestic reforms, 
they overcame knee-jerk rejections of institutionalization and started choosing the most 
effective ways to solve particular problems.  
Efforts to build institutional frameworks in the region have so far developed in four 
distinct stages.  The three driving forces as well as ambivalent attitudes in the region 
have persisted throughout most of these periods.  As noted above, however, different 
forces and different balances in the spectrum of attitudes came into play at each stage, 
thus determining the developments in a particular period.  History tells us that ignored 
or frustrated factors or interests will eventually catch up and affect ensuing 
developments.  Stable development of regional institutions in East Asia requires  a 
careful design that takes the different dynamics into consideration.   
 
1st Stage: Competition and Interaction among Various Proposals 
The first period, between 1985 and 1992, saw active competition amongst different 
regional framework  proposals.  It is in this period, that the  “local economic factor” 
formed.  In the wake of the sharp appreciation of the yen after the Plaza Accord in 1985, 
economic interdependence among East Asian economies was substantially increased 
through foreign direct investment (FDI) by Japanese companies, mainly in ASEAN, as 
well as by companies in newly industrializing economies (NIEs) that suffered from the 
subsequent appreciation of their currencies against the U.S. dollar.  Development of 
trade and investment in the region prepared policymakers to create regional forums to 
strengthen interdependence, albeit with strong tendencies to avoid preferential trade 
agreements at this point, and to nurture joint efforts to protect their emerging common   7
interests as a region.   
The first actual stimulus for economic integration came from the United States, 
which proposed an FTA with ASEAN in 1985.  The U.S. government was under pressure 
from a growing trade deficit with Asian countries despite the depreciation of the U.S. 
dollar, and tried to promote exports through market opening arrangements.  ASEAN 
member economies, for their part, had been focused on developing export industries 
through free trade zones while largely protecting their domestic markets and, therefore, 
were not ready for drastic trade liberalization with the United States.  Proposals for a 
U.S.-Japan FTA as well as a U.S.-Korea FTA were also considered in U.S. policy circles 
in the late 1980s. 
These U.S. proposals left Asian policymakers concerned about U.S. “hub and spoke” 
approach to trade policy that could leave “spoke economies” at a disadvantage.  Trade 
friction with the United States w as also prevalent.  At the same time, they were 
concerned  about developments  towards regionalism  in Europe and North America. 
These situations prompted Australia and Japan to come up with the idea of the Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), which was established in 1989.  It was hoped that 
U.S. participation would help restrain its “hub and spoke” FTA initiatives as well as its 
unilateral trade sanctions.  Also, there was uncertainty about the future of the U.S. 
security presence in post-Cold War Asia and East Asian capitals felt a strong need to 
anchor U.S. interests in the region.  At first, however, to Washington’s dismay, a trade 
liberalization agenda was avoided in  consideration  of sensitivity among ASEAN 
members  and, h ence, APEC focused on economic cooperation  projects  to promote 
development and trade expansion. 
In late 1990,  frustrated by APEC’s apparent inability to check North American 
regionalism  as well as difficulties in concluding the Uruguay Round of trade 
negotiations, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad proposed the East Asian   8
Economic Group (EAEG) consisting of ASEAN countries, Japan, China and Korea, as a 
more direct  response to trends  in Europe and North America towards increased 
regionalism.  At the beginning, it was presented as a possible trading bloc. Later it was 
renamed the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) and presented as a forum to discuss 
issues of common interests among East Asian neighbors.  At this time, China was not 
yet an APEC member, and Japan was at the height of its economic might.  The proposal 
met strong objections from Washington as something that would draw a dividing line in 
the middle of the Pacific and did not have the support of East Asian economies.  While 
East Asian economies did not have  compelling  interests to promote this idea in 
particular as they felt the need to anchor U.S. interest, the strong U.S. reaction left East 
Asian policy makers with a feeling that they should be able to choose for themselves 
with whom they meet and talk.  There was also a feeling that the United States, which 
had already agreed with Mexico to start negotiations for what would become NAFTA, 
was behaving hypocritically. 
 After the EAEC setback, ASEAN started an economic integration initiative, which 
was the  ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992.  ASEAN had been promoting 
programs to increase interdependence through various programs2 without much success 
due to the political sensitivities of their domestic industries.  Since the end of the Cold 
War, however, Eastern European countries and China emerged as competitors for FDI.  
And there was also a concern that ASEAN could be absorbed in APEC and would lose 
bargaining power.  Thus, an enhanced sense of urgency enabled ASEAN members to 
agree on the first framework of comprehensive regional economic integration in East 
Asia. 
In 1991, China, Chinese Taipei and Hong Kong simultaneously joined APEC.  
                                                   
2 For example, there were programs based on Agreement on ASEAN Preferential 
Trading Arrangements (1977), Basic Agreement on ASEAN Industrial 
Complementation (1981), Basic Agreement on ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures (1983).   9
Hereafter, the importance of APEC increased significantly.  The EAEC proposal 
persuaded Washington that APEC was the way to prevent Asian-only frameworks.  
Under the Clinton Administration, the United States renewed its interest in opening up 
Asian markets through APEC. This began the transition to the second period.  The 
possibility of creating an APEC FTA was suggested by the Eminent Persons Group 
tasked to draw up a vision for APEC. 
In this first period as described above,  the main driving force was the 
“counter-regionalism factor” and the “leverage-seeking factor”.  Attitudes towards each 
other (“local economic factor”) did not play a large role.  While there was an impulse to 
get together, there was little focus or substance.  Also, China’s lukewarm reaction to 
regional fora proved to be another centrifugal force. 
In this period, with an absence of a region-wide framework, there was a tendency to 
try to find a single formula that would accommodate all of these forces.  Competing 
proposals were viewed as inconsistent with each other.  This explains the focus on 
membership, rather than on core objectives and specific measures to be taken, under 
each framework. 
 
2nd Stage: Primacy of APEC 
The second period started in 1993 when the United States chaired APEC and ended 
in 1997 when East Asia was hit by a major financial crisis.  In this period, APEC came 
out as the primary vehicle for regional cooperation.  U.S. leadership, Asian economies’ 
confidence in their economic dynamism as well as competition for FDI and other forms of 
capital finally persuaded members to overcome resistance to pursue liberalization in 
APEC.  The United States hosted the first leaders’ meeting in Seattle, an important 
mechanism to overcoming bureaucratic resistance to liberalization.  At the same time, 
with East Asian economies’ concern about preferential trade arrangements, as well as   10
political difficulties hindering trade liberalization at a pace set by negotiations, there 
was no agreement to form an APEC FTA.  In 1994, under the Indonesian chair, the 
leaders adopted the Bogor goal of liberalization in APEC by 2010 for developed 
economies and 2020 for developing economies.  In 1995, APEC leaders agreed on the 
Osaka Action Agenda as a mechanism to achieve the Bogor goal, which was essentially 
based on members’ voluntary efforts and peer pressure to encourage each other. 
While APEC became the primary economic forum in the region, it did not fulfill most 
of the expectations that its members had at the forum’s inception.     
First, while concern about the U.S. “hub and spoke” approach to trade policy was 
eliminated for the time being, APEC  was not  effective  in checking the increasing 
momentum for regionalism in North America, no to speak of Europe.  The U.S. and other 
Western Hemisphere leaders met in December 1994 in Miami and agreed to construct 
FTAA, in which barriers to trade and investment would be progressively eliminated, and 
to complete negotiations for the agreement by 2005.  After the successful completion of 
the Uruguay Round and the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
where the perceived threat of an APEC FTA played a constructive role in persuading EU 
to make a compromise, the trend toward regionalism was s till intact.   A s for U.S. 
unilateral trade sanctions, WTO dispute settlement mechanism, instead of APEC, 
provided the solution. 
Second,  U.S. desire to open Asian markets was  eventually  frustrated.   While 
liberalization became a central  focus on  APEC’s agenda, implementation was not 
effective, as it was left to voluntarism and peer pressure, which did not produce much 
progress.  The limitations of the APEC mechanism for liberalization later became clear 
with the failure of the U.S.-sponsored initiative of Early Voluntary Sectoral 
Liberalization (EVSL).  Despite the name, it was essentially an initiative to negotiate a 
package of sector-specific liberalization among APEC members.  Japan and some   11
developing country members, particularly those hit by the Asian financial crisis, were 
not ready to liberalize politically sensitive sectors.  The United States, for its part, did 
not have fast track authority for trade agreements and put pressure to exclude sensitive 
U.S. sectors from liberalization, notably textiles.  When members were saddled with 
political difficulties, unilateral liberalization that would allow free riding by non-APEC 
members was too ambitious, while, at the same time, APEC members were too diverse to 
forge an APEC-wide FTA. 
Third, the Asian countries’ desire to have an effective framework of cooperation was 
not satisfied  either.  Economic cooperation as opposed to trade and investment 
liberalization was given a lower priority in APEC.  Project proposals proliferated under 
the  rotating chair system t hat changed every year, but there were few efforts to 
systematically follow up on those proposals.  Frustration culminated when the EVSL 
was determined to be the primary item on the 1998 APEC agenda in late 1997, shortly 
after the eruption of the Asian financial crisis.   
The ASEAN desire to be a viable organization  was satisfied  outside APEC  by 
accelerating the schedule of AFTA and taking the initiative in creating forums centering 
on ASEAN such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)(1994)  and  the Asia Europe 
Meeting (ASEM)(1996), as well as expanding dialogues with various countries in the 
“ASEAN + ” format and post-Ministerial Conferences (PMC) which have existed since 
the  1970s.   It should be noted that ASEM opened up opportunities for East Asian 
countries to meet in preparation before meeting with Europeans, though Chinese Taipei 
and Hong Kong were not included due to the political issues included in the ASEM 
agenda.  While these fora satisfied Asian countries’ desire to try out various types of fora 
and promoted mutual understanding  between members, they were not necessarily 
successful in achieving specific, substantive results.   
The fundamental problem of APEC was that it grew too fast without solidifying its   12
core objectives, and its members differed on what APEC should do.  Rather than closing 
the gap, it added to the agenda, knowing that some issues would not be addressed fully.  
Instead of solving problems it avoided conflict, thus ignoring some of the key motivations 
of its members.  The lessons from APEC experiences are that they cannot expect APEC 
to solve all problems and should have  complementary  fora,  that consist  of smaller 
members whose interests converge. 
At the same time, APEC has incubated regional cooperation in Asia.  It has brought 
government and business together in the region through many meetings and projects.  It 
has made them aware of common problems, new measures for cooperation as well as 
different priorities.  And all these experiences laid the groundwork for the next period. 
 
3rd Stage: Formation of ASEAN+3 and Proliferation of Bilateral FTAs 
The transition to the third period started with the Asian financial crisis that erupted 
in July 1997.  It was a major turning point for the development of regional frameworks 
in Asia by changing both the local landscape and mindset.  The crisis shattered the 
confidence among ASEAN economies and significantly weakened ASEAN’s 
cohesiveness.3  Korea’s economic policy was revolutionized and its economic structure 
became much more open.  The Japanese economy’s problems became all too clear, and 
people began calling the 1990s Japan’s  “lost decade”.   
                                                   
3 The influence of ASEAN, which had had a central role in developing various regional 
fora as a benign mediator among regional powers, was sharply reduced in the wake of 
Asian financial crisis.  China’s relatively stable economic performance throughout the 
East Asian economic crisis, the surge of FDI into Korea, and the collapse of domestic 
demand and slow progress of economic reform in ASEAN tempered the commonly held 
perception of ASEAN member countries as attractive investment destinations.  The 
addition of four new members widened the intra-regional economic gap, and 
compounded with the diversity of political systems, put pressure on ASEAN’s 
cohesiveness.  In Indonesia political turmoil caused economic stagnation, and the lack of 
Indonesian leadership and members’ preoccupation with domestic economic problems 
dealt a severe blow to proactive ASEAN initiatives present before the crisis.  Thus the 
decline of ASEAN’s influence in these aspects and shift of gravity to Northeast Asia 
prompted Singapore to strike out on its own and strengthen relations with countries   13
In this period, two major changes took place.  First of all, the “ASEAN + 3” format 
ceased to be a taboo.  Secondly, preferential trade agreements such as FTAs ceased to be 
taboo for Northeast Asian economies as well.  With these two constraints gone there was 
enormous excitement to try various alternatives. 
One of the main reasons behind this change was frustration with the United States 
and the “Washington consensus” (the “leverage-seeking factor”).  Asian economies were 
deeply disappointed by U.S. insistence on EVSL in the middle of the Asian crisis, initial 
U.S. reluctance to provide financial assistance to Thailand, and IMF “conditionality” 
that initially exacerbated the crisis.   
In addition, the acute sense of interdependence aroused by the financial “contagion” 
convinced not only ASEAN but also Northeast Asian countries that they need a regional 
forum for economic cooperation, one that reflected their common interests and priorities 
as well as increased their voice in the global arena (“local economic factor”). 
On the other hand, t he reduced momentum for liberalization through APEC 
disappointed  Washington, and depression in Asian economies dampened U.S. 
enthusiasm in the region’s markets.  The focus of U.S. trade policy interest in Asia 
shifted to the negotiations for China’s WTO accession.  At the same time, Washington 
renewed its interest in FTAs and floated a “P5” initiative among the United States, Chile, 
Singapore, Australia and New Zealand, the five  “like-minded” countries.  These 
developments convinced Asian capitols that they did not always have to involve the 
United States in a particular regional framework other than APEC.  And a forum among 
East Asian economies ceased to be a taboo.   
Against this backdrop,  ASEAN + 3, a gathering of the governments of ASEAN 
members, China, Korea and Japan that were Asian members of ASEM, had its first 
leaders’ meeting in December 1997.  After the idea of an Asian Monetary Fund failed due 
                                                                                                                                                     
outside ASEAN.   14
to U.S. and Chinese opposition, East Asian countries started to develop a network of 
currency swap agreements through the “Chiang Mai Initiative”.   
Regionalism in Europe and North America maintained momentum and continued to 
expand geographically and functionally.  Asian economies, worried about these trends as 
well as intrigued by regional institutions’ effect on accelerating domestic reforms in 
member economies, came to think that since there was no way to stop it, they should 
also get involved in preferential trade agreements (“counter-regionalism factor”).  Thus 
skepticism towards regional institutions in general and Northeast Asian economies’ 
rejection of preferential trade arrangements was finally overcome. 
ASEAN  +  3, however, lacked enough cohesiveness to  adopt a preferential trade 
agreement that would cover them all, though they later started discussions on the East 
Asian FTA proposal.  Interest in bilateral FTAs or economic agreements suddenly 
became prevalent in the region as a more practical vehicle of liberalization, a more 
effective way to avoid being marginalized in the global trend towards regionalism, and a 
more focused approach to solving specific problems.  
After Japan and Korea started to explore the possibility of an FTA between them, 
bilateral negotiations for FTAs rapidly became active.  New Zealand and Singapore 
spearheaded these trends.  Singapore’s moves, independent of other ASEAN members, 
indicated that ASEAN (at least temporarily) lost the driving force it used to command to 
create larger institutional frameworks.  Japan and Korea changed their long-standing 
policy of exclusive multilateralism and adopted a multi-track policy, where bilateral and 
regional preferential arrangements have roles to complement the WTO.  Korea started 
FTA negotiations with Chile, and Japan concluded an Economic Partnership Agreement 
with Singapore, which includes various measures for cooperation to expand bilateral 
economic relations in addition to the traditional elements of FTAs. 
Japan’s decision to negotiate an FTA with Singapore on October 22, 2000 had a   15
energizing effect in and outside the region.  Singapore, which started to pursue a 
strategy of becoming “a hub of FTAs,” actively explored the possibility for FTAs with 
major economic powers, such as the United States, Europe and China.  Washington, 
which had been inactive on the “P5” initiative, increased its interest in an FTA with 
Singapore.  The U.S. President Bill Clinton and Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok 
Tong unexpectedly announced their agreement to start negotiations on a bilateral FTA 
on November 16, 2000, at the margin of  the  APEC leaders’ meeting.  Since Asian 
countries have started their own preferential trade arrangements, fear of the US “hub 
and spoke” approach c eased to be a common concern.  Singapore’s move motivated 
ASEAN reaction to explore FTAs with other Asian economies, first with Australia and 
New Zealand and then with China, Korea and Japan.  China, having closely watched 
Japan’s trade policy shift, decided to join the regional trend of exploring FTAs.  At the 
ASEAN-China Summit on November 25, 2000, China’s Premier Zhu Rongji proposed an 
ASEAN-China Expert Group on Economic Cooperation to look into the implications of 
China’s accession to the WTO and recommend measures on how to further enhance 
ASEAN-China economic cooperation and integration, including the possibility of 
establishing a free trade area between the two.  This move was the precursor to China’s 
active  efforts to seek  an  FTA with ASEAN and its leadership role in East Asian 
frameworks during the 4th stage. 
 
4th Stage: China’s Active Participation 
The fourth period is characterized by a change in Beijing’s attitude towards regional 
cooperation.  The transition to the fourth period started in the summer of 1999, when 
China began attaching more importance to its relations with neighboring countries.  In 
the wake of the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999, Sino-U.S. 
relations were particularly tense.  China started to view East Asian cooperation as a   16
vehicle for  “multi-polarity” –the reduction of U.S. dominance.  Beijing, well aware of the 
perceived "China threat" –both economic and military– felt by its neighbors, has been 
making efforts, through its support for regional political and economic structures, to 
reduce regional anxiety about its strategic intentions.  In addition, in view of increased 
competition with imports after the accession to the WTO,  China was interested in 
expanding export markets and thus worried about the trend for preferential trade 
agreements, which had spread even to Asia as it was about to join the WTO.  In light of 
this, Prime Minister Zhu proposed an FTA with ASEAN in November 2000.  After a year 
of review, China and ASEAN agreed in November 2001 to negotiate for an FTA to be 
completed within 10 years.  For ASEAN members, except for advanced economies such 
as Singapore, China’s exports present a competitive threat.  Therefore, China’s offer of 
“early harvest,” where China would reduce tariffs of interest to new ASEAN members 
early on, had a decisive role in persuading ASEAN to accept China’s FTA proposal.   
Since the completion of negotiations for WTO accession, China has become markedly 
more active in engaging in regional frameworks.  Thus, this period started in 2001 when 
China joined the WTO.   
China's rapid growth and steadily increasing economic integration in the region 
aroused further interest in regional frameworks.  On the one hand, China's neighbors 
are concerned about the "hollowing out" of their industries; on the other hand, they are 
eager for a slice of the ever-growing Chinese economic pie.  These concerns and interests 
grew as exports to other regions were radically reduced in the recent global recession.  
Thus, China’s active participation in regional agreements has activated competitive 
impulses within East Asia and added momentum for regional bilateral FTAs.  Two 
months after China and ASEAN announced their agreement to negotiate an FTA to be 
concluded in ten years, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro made a trip to 
ASEAN countries in January 2002 and proposed an Initiative for Japan-ASEAN   17
Comprehensive Economic Partnership though it may not necessarily include an FTA.  
Japanese government officials are in fact welcoming China’s move since it helps them 
overcome domestic resistance to liberalizing trade in sensitive sectors.  Shortly after 
Prime Minister Koizumi’s proposal, Japan and ASEAN started to consider specific 
measures to realize it.  Korea is also considering an FTA with A SEAN.  Thus, 
“competition to cooperate” has become the modus operandi.  
For several reasons, Washington has begun to pay more attention in the region:  
China’s rise, when Japan --the primary U.S. ally in Asia-- was stagnating, combined 
with its active regional economic diplomacy vis-à-vis ASEAN including promoting an 
FTA, indicated a potential shift in the regional balance of power.  At the same time, a 
weakened ASEAN led to increased security concerns, such as ASEAN becoming a hotbed 
of terrorism.  The United States agreed with Thailand in April 2002 to begin work on a 
Trade and Investment Framework Agreement, which will set up a permanent joint 
consultation system to study elements of a bilateral FTA and solve trade problems.  The 
United States, urged by business interests, also looked into the idea of an FTA with 
ASEAN in a U.S.-ASEAN economic ministers meeting held early in April 2002, while 
admitting it is premature to enter into negotiations with ASEAN as a whole.  In the 
meantime, Senator Lugar (R-Indiana) introduced a bill on March 11, 2002 that would 
authorize negotiation of an FTA with the Philippines. 
Meanwhile, Japan and Korea, after more than three years of consideration by think 
tanks and a business forum, finally agreed to start official discussion for a bilateral FTA 
during the Japanese Prime Minister’s trip to Seoul in March 2002.  Taiwan and Hong 
Kong are also considering various FTAs.  Thus, in the fourth period, all East Asian 
economies are engaged in various bilateral free trade efforts.   
Bilateral FTAs include not just those within East Asia but also cross-regional ones.  
East Asian economies are seeking opportunities where the benefit is large enough or the   18
hurdle is low enough to overcome  domestic resistance.  For example, Korea is 
negotiating an FTA with Chile and Japan is studying an FTA with Mexico.  Singapore is 
negotiating an FTA with the United States and has concluded one with European Free 
Trade Association  (EFTA, an arrangement consisting of Switzerland, Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Norway).  Thus, they are actively trying to overcome discrimination 
in other regions and to enhance their leverage in negotiations.  They also expect that 
new round of  WTO  trade negotiations will reduce the margin of preference for 
preferential trade arrangements. 
At the same time, there was a conceptual leap in the regional front.  The East Asian 
Vision Group submitted a report on “an East Asian Community” to the leaders of the 
ASEAN + 3 meeting, which was recognized in the press statement by the chairman of 
the 5th ASEAN + 3 summit, November 5, 2001.  
As regional economies started to deepen bilateral relations with each other, they 
were empowered with more effective measures to address specific problems without 
waiting for consensus in a larger group, where not all the members share the same sense 
of urgency regarding particular problems.  Previously, the forum came first and the 
substance was taken up only when it fitted the forum.  Now, substance comes first and 
the forum  is tailored  to deal with the substance as chosen or devised if necessary.  
Bilateral arrangements have become available as the smallest alternatives among 
various fora from which to choose.  Thus, a multi-layered approach where bilateral, 





   19
II.  Prospects for East Asian Economic Integration 
 
The first section identified underlying forces that largely determined how 
institutional frameworks for regional integration evolved in the region.  With this 
background in mind, the following section assesses the challenges and opportunities for 
Asian economic integration in the future. 
 
Momentum for an East Asia-wide Framework 
While East Asian experiences creating various regional institutional arrangements 
have been a process of trial-and-error, there has always been momentum for creating a 
pan-East Asian framework.  The recent surge in this momentum has largely been driven 
by China, with its vast economic potential (an element of the local economic factor) from 
which all its neighbors wish to benefit.  Even countries not yet ready to consider an FTA 
with China are eager to somehow maximize their gain and minimize their losses in their 
economic relations with China. 
At the same time, China tries to use East Asian cooperation as a vehicle to promote 
multi-polarity in the world (an element of the leverage-seeking factor).  Other regional 
economies also see the benefits of a region-wide framework since it is more powerful 
than a web of bilateral FTAs in terms of the  “counter-regionalism factor” and the 
“leverage-seeking factor”.  
Another powerful element of the local economic calculation is the recognition within 
East Asian capitals that extreme dependence on the U.S. market, when the United 
States has a ccumulated huge current account surpluses, makes Asian economies 
vulnerable.  The U.S. current account deficit has ballooned to the level of 4% of GDP 
even during recession.  When U.S. imports further increase in the coming boom, there is 
a risk that political pressure behind protecting U.S. industries will strengthen and that   20
the dollar could sharply depreciate, which would destabilize Asian economies.  The U.S. 
safeguard measures recently imposed against steel imports are an ominous sign.  In 
view of this, East Asia must reduce its dependence on exports outside the region and 
base its economic growth more firmly on domestic or regional demand in order to 
stabilize the regional and global economy.  This requires external policy initiatives in 
addition to solving domestic problems such as deregulation or clearing up bad debt.  To 
stimulate regional demand,  it will be critical to  eliminate barriers to cross-border 
movement of corporate resources, thereby integrating long-fragmented regional markets 
and, in turn, enhancing the profitability of business activities to serve regional demand. 
Thus, there is a hope among East Asian economies to eventually establish an “East 
Asia Community” as proposed by the East Asian Vision Group.  While engaged in 
competition to forge bilateral FTAs, many East Asian capitals hope that independent 
moves will eventually converge to form an East Asian FTA.  
 
Obstacles 
Despite strong momentum for creating  an institutional framework for regional 
integration in East Asia, its realization is far from easy.  There are several powerful 
obstacles, which can also be turned into new opportunities.   
 
1) Sensitive Sectors 
First, there is a practical difficulty in liberalizing trade among East Asian countries 
consistent with WTO stipulations that preferential trade agreements have to eliminate 
trade barriers of “substantially all the trade” (Article 24-8(b) of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)).  Products from politically sensitive sectors for developed 
economies, such as agriculture and textiles, are often competitive and could be a source 
of precious income for developing economies.  For East Asian economies to overcome   21
political sensitivities in trade issues, it is extremely  important for Japan, the most 
developed economy in the region, to take the initiative. 
Unfortunately, however, Japan has particularly sensitive agriculture, forestry and 
fisheries sectors.  While these industries comprise only a fraction of Japan’s economy, 
they have taken on a disproportionate weight within Japan’s overall trade policy.  In its 
post-War development process, Japan relied on a limited number of competitive sectors 
to earn foreign currency and tax revenue while protecting and subsidizing low 
productivity sectors.  These sectors have not only been protected from international 
competition but also from domestic competition (i.e. some large corporations are not 
allowed to enter agriculture).  Shielded from tough competition, these sectors have 
lagged in productivity growth and their international competitiveness has deteriorated.  
But the population involved in these sectors remains important voters for powerful 
conservative politicians representing rural areas.  This situation makes trade 
liberalization all the more difficult.  Japan has to reengineer its agricultural policy to 
encourage viable agricultural business and effectively address problems such as 
environmental and safety concerns.  Recent incidents, such as false labeling of where 
meat was produced, as well as the government’s failure to prevent the spread of mad cow 
disease, have substantially reduced consumer confidence in agricultural policy and have 
opened an opportunity for a major policy review.  After all, it is high time that Tokyo 
analyzes the cost associated with an inability to conclude FTAs to nullify the effect of 
rapidly proliferating preferential trade agreements that place Japanese businesses and 
workforce at a substantial disadvantage. 
 As will be discussed in the next section, Japan’s deliberate one-by-one choice of FTA 
partners, with a goal of steadily overcoming political resistance, making it more likely 
that bilateral, rather than region-wide, FTAs have more momentum in the region at 
least for a while.   22
 
2) Diverse Developmental Stages 
Second, different developmental stages among East Asian economies also make 
extensive trade liberalization difficult.  Developing economies need industries to raise 
income levels and tariffs cannot be eliminated overnight when these economies strive to 
develop viable industries.  Development a ssistance should, in addition to directly 
dealing with poverty alleviation, focus on enhancing infrastructure, policy design, and 
human resource development in government and business, so that they are more 
prepared to liberalize their economies.  Liberalization is not an end in itself, but a means 
to achieve economic prosperity.  Developing economies need the capability to maintain a 
competitive business environment and economic and social stability in order to 
capitalize on the benefits of liberalization.  Development assistance to  “prepare 
economies for liberalization” needs to be incorporated into regional integration 
frameworks that involve developing economies.   
This is an area where Asia has the potential to make an intellectual contribution to 
the g lobal community since Asia is the only region in the world where so many 
developing economies have succeeded in industrialization in a short period of time.  If 
Asian economic integration can successfully combine liberalization and rule making 
with assistance to developing economies, which will help them participate in regional 
economic integration, it will also provide some insight on how to integrate poorer 
countries into the global economy.  Making those countries viable players in the global 
market is preferable to making them dependent on assistance. 
Diversity in developmental stages means that there are different sets of problems 
between each pair of East Asian economies.  If an FTA is viewed as a set of solutions to 
real problems, rather than a legal template, it is more important to study bilateral 
economic relations closely and work out essential elements for respective FTAs rather   23
than to think of big, conceptual, pan-regional frameworks without knowing  which 
specific issues will be addressed by such frameworks. 
 
3) Lack of Confidence in Japan’s Leadership among Its Neighbors 
After the  Japanese economy’s  decade-long stagnation, many question Japan’s 
capacity to lead East Asian economic integration.  This issue will be discussed in section 
III. 
In addition, Japan’s “history problem” with its neighbors could get in the way of 
developing institutional frameworks to promote economic integration in Asia.  Japan did 
not play an active role in formulating the postwar world economic order, while 
concentrating on economic reconstruction.  Tokyo refrained from taking the initiative in 
formulating regional frameworks in light of its wartime legacy.  In addition, since the 
end of the Cold War, the nature of the history problem has changed.  Asian people freely 
express their  concerns about Japan’s recognition of  “history” issues and bring up 
individual claims for compensation for their wartime sufferings.  
Government-to-government settlement of the history problem does not guarantee public 
support for reconciliation, upon which the ultimate solution of this problem depends.  
When Tokyo and Seoul started to explore the idea of an FTA, both were extremely 
sensitive about the possibility that it could evoke memories of Japanese colonization 
given that their reconciliation was incomplete.   
The solutions to the history issues are directly linked to trust.  Many Asian policy 
makers have pointed out that if Japan hopes to gain confidence among its neighbors, it 
needs to articulate its national strategy and the role it is willing to play in the region.  
This will involve a long-overdue comprehensive review of Japan’s national strategy 
given post-Cold War realities and Japan’s decade-long economic stagnation. 
   24
4) Japan-China Relations 
The surge of the Chinese economy throughout the 1990s when Japan was suffering 
from economic stagnation  and de facto integration of the Japanese and Chinese 
economies have fueled the debate in Japan that China is an economic threat.  However, 
others recognize the still largely complementary nature of bilateral economic relations 
and see huge opportunities in China’ s market and abundant labor force.  At the same 
time, China's enhanced economic power has allowed increased annual Chinese military 
expenditure, which, together with issues related to Taiwan and the activities of Chinese 
research ships in Japanese waters, creates a growing sense in Japan of a security threat 
from China.  
On the other hand, from China’s point of view, Japanese views regarding its history 
as well as the Taiwan issue, are nurturing Chinese grass-roots suspicion of Japan and 
justify Beijing’s repeated demand for Japan’s apology, which in turn provokes Japanese 
public resentment.  China worries that the US-Japan security alliance is a part of a U.S. 
strategy to encircle China.  At the same time, Beijing appreciates that the U.S. security 
presence in the region prevents Japanese rearmament.  China aspires to be the Asian 
leader in the future and has tried to check Japan’s political leadership in the region as 
well as in the global arena. 
Asian neighbors worry that this mutual suspicion and distrust between Japan and 
China will hinder the development of regional cooperation and put pressure on them to 
choose sides.  Often compared to Germany and France, Japan and China will both 
remain regional leaders, while cooperating and competing at the same time.  It is crucial 
for the two regional powers to find a way to eliminate their sources of distrust and build 
a stable and cooperative bilateral relationship.   
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Likely Process of Asian Economic Integration 
As described above, competition among regional powers still seems stronger than 
cooperation, preventing a full-fledged, European-style economic integration.  After all, 
this region lacks the kind of overwhelming geopolitical challenge that helped postwar 
Europe to cohere.  In addition, regional frameworks have to be able to accommodate the 
practical need to overcome political resistance or to work out details in light of regional 
diversity and these considerations are driving bilateral or sub-regional agreements.  
Therefore, it will take a long time for region-wide institutions such as the East Asian 
Free Trade Area to move beyond political statements.  
Thus, it is probable that competitive bilateral or smaller, multilateral agreements in 
and outside the region will be developed in parallel, together with regional, 
cross-regional and global frameworks just as we see them today.  And there will be 
ongoing feedback among these various fora.  Bilateral solutions that were worked out 
based on clarified common interests may be applicable to other members and thus have 
a potential to become a model for larger forums.  New ideas discussed in larger fora may 
become legally binding agreements among like-minded economies.  At the same time, 
channels  such  as ASEAN  +  3 as well as APEC are available to promote common 
interests with a stronger influence than what bilateral channels can command.   
This model of competitive regional cooperation, or multi-layered regional 
frameworks, can find its counterpart already in Europe and North America where some 
of the most influential players in the global rule-making process, capitalizing on their 
local efforts  toward creating a more business-friendly environment, interact and 
stimulate global efforts. 
The open and dynamic nature of these multi-layered frameworks in the region also 
serves in accommodating U.S. engagement in the region.  As Asian economies depend 
heavily on the U.S. market, technology, investment, not to mention regional stability   26
enabled by the U.S. security presence, the evolution of regional frameworks was partly 
born of the process of struggling to find the solution to a dilemma: how to anchor U.S. 
interests in the region while at the same time create a regional mechanism to deal with 
common interests among Asian economies that do not always have the same interests as 
the United States, and to have some bargaining power vis-à-vis the most influential 
superpower in the region.  Now, bilateral or smaller multilateral agreements with the 
United States will be a part of the multi-layered frameworks in the region.  U.S. efforts 
to conclude FTAs with East Asian economies will accelerate its partners’ economic 
liberalization and enhance the transparency of their economic systems, thereby 
preparing East Asian economies for economic integration among themselves as well. 
Through interaction among various fora, a primary region-wide framework, such as 
an East Asian Community—as well as a sense of community or regional identity—will 
eventually  evolve, while competition will stimulate regional economies to overcome 
domestic resistance to reform and liberalization so as to avoid marginalization.  How 
long this evolution takes depends on how the challenges identified above are overcome.  
The membership of such a primary forum may not necessarily be the same as ASEAN + 
3 and depends on how other economies will interact with current members of ASEAN + 3, 
how the business and the economic environments interact and affect the pattern of 
interdependence in the region and how core interests and priorities of the economies 
involved will converge in the future.4  Its nature also depends on the process of its 
                                                   
4 In this connection, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi proposed the creation of a 
“community that acts together and advances together” whose core members he expects 
to be the countries of ASEAN, Japan, China, the Republic of Korea, Australia and New 
Zealand. See, Speech by Prime Minister of Japan Junichiro Koizumi,  “Japan and 
ASEAN in East Asia – A Sincere and Open Partnership,” January 14, 2002, Singapore.  
Koizumi started to refer to his proposal as “ an initiative for a growing East Asian 
community” in his o pening statements at the Joint Press Conference with  Prime 
Minister Helen Clark of New Zealand, 2 May 2002. 




There are several elements that will largely affect the evolutionally process 
described above, including the following: 
 
1) Will Japan regain its economic vitality and gain trust among its neighbors? 
If yes, Japan can play a leadership role in the region, along with China.  A revitalized 
and trusted Japan is instrumental in maintaining regional stability during transition 
while China transforms itself into a liberal democratic society or at least becomes 
perceived to be a benign power.  If not, Japan will be marginalized, China will be the 
only dominant player among East Asian countries, and regional stability will be largely 
influenced by the ups and downs in China’s economic, social and political 
transformation. 
It is unlikely that Japan can regain its economic vitality while remaining the object 
of distrust and suspicion.  As detailed in the next section, the institutional 
transformation (to become  an  attractive destination for highly productive economic 
resources), which Japan has to go through to regain economic strength, requires Tokyo 
to deal with the sources of mistrust among its  neighbors.   In other words, needed 
changes in Japan’s social and economic systems have “institutional complementarity” 
with Japan’s deeper integration with Asia.  Without overcoming this historical 
animosity and lingering suspicions, it is unlikely that Japan, which has long finished the 
catch up phase and is now faced with the challenge of an aging population, will have a 
strong enough appeal to attract competitive professionals. 
                                                                                                                                                     
Aside from the Koizumi proposal, it is natural that Hong Kong and Chinese Taipei, 
which are also the member economies of APEC and the WTO signatory, join the future 
pan-East Asian economic framework.    28
 
2) Will China become a liberal democratic society (or be perceived as a benign power) 
after achieving economic development or remain an authoritarian regime? 
I assume that the Chinese economy will continue to grow despite difficult challenges 
with occasional shocks and  adjustments.  At the same time, the degree of its 
enforcement of the WTO  rules will largely determine the level of institutional 
integration with neighboring economies.  In other words, while it cannot fully 
implement WTO rules, it is unlikely to be able to enforce additional bilateral or regional 
agreements.   
If China becomes a liberal democratic society, neighboring countries will be much 
more comfortable with China’s leadership.  While there will be economic competition 
with the United States, bilateral tension will be manageable. 
As long as China remains an authoritarian regime, the United States as well as 
other liberal democracies in East Asia, will feel uneasy about the region being 
dominated by China.  The United States will effectively play the role of counter-balance 
vis-à-vis China, leaving the region in a state of tension.  In this case, while China will be 
an economic power that enjoys interdependence with its neighbors, the scope of its 
leadership will be limited.  Also, the scope of economic rules that can be harmonized with 
its neighbors will be limited as well.  It is likely that economic interdependence as well 
as China’s focus on economic growth will keep the tension manageable while China’s 
economic growth and increasingly affluent population allow for greater sociopolitical 
freedoms.  Hopefully, this process will lead to a more benign China.  Thus, it is desirable 
to integrate China into regional institutions to enhance its interdependence with its 
neighbors. However, China’s political system and external posture will affect its 
neighbors’ willingness to strengthen institutional relations with it. 
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3) Will the United States play a constructive role in East Asian integration? 
If the United States plays a constructive role as described in section IV, the U.S. 
influence, regardless of its membership will further increase in the region. If not, it is 




III.  Japan’s Role in East Asian Integration 
 
As the largest economy in East Asia5, Japan has a crucial role in determining the 
course of East Asian regional frameworks for the foreseeable future.  Success or failure 
of Japan’s policy efforts determines whether the challenges identified in the previous 
section can be overcome.  Japan’s economic vitality and Asian dynamism are mutually 
dependent.  Despite current economic difficulties, hopefully the positive experience of 
competition and cooperation with its neighbors will give Japan the energy to move 
forward.  
 
Japan’s Economic Challenges 
There are differing points of view about how Japan can get out of its decade long 
stagnation.  Neither massive pump priming nor zero interest rate policy solved the 
problem.  Many argue that the ultimate solution is to separate non-performing loans 
(NPLs) from bank balance sheets, to close down nonviable businesses and to free up 
resources for more productive uses.  While NPL disposal and macroeconomic stimulus to 
cushion its deflationary impact is important to prevent an economic crisis in Japan, they 
do not guarantee Japan’s economic recovery.   
                                                   
5 Japan’s share in East Asian income is 67% in 2000.   30
A more fundamental problem of the Japanese economy is the erosion of Japanese 
corporate competitiveness and profitability.  Increased competition from China only 
makes its task of substantial industrial adjustment all the more urgent. 
Japan’s economic model in the post-War period was based on a dual structure 
consisting of a limited number of competitive industries and a large number of protected, 
inefficient industries.  This duality created a high-cost structure in Japan’s business 
environment.  At the same time, business practices such as lifetime employment and the 
“main bank” system (that were successful during the high growth era) largely ensured a 
stable supply of a loyal workforce and low cost finance within each closed business 
network, hampering development of open markets for corporate resources. 
Globalization and information technology brought about  a  new competitive 
environment where corporate resources go beyond organizational and national 
boundaries to wherever they can maximize their value.  At the same time, the Japanese 
population is aging and shrinking, limiting the prospects of domestic demand growth.  
High-performing industries, increasingly under competitive pressure from developing 
Asia and elsewhere, started to shift their operations  overseas, while inefficient 
industries remain at home demanding protection and subsidies.  Japan can no longer 
afford to have protected sectors that depend on the earnings from a few competitive 
sectors.  Thus, the dual structure has simply become unsustainable.   
The Japanese economic system and corporate behavior have not yet adapted to this 
new competitive reality.  Lack of adequate external markets for corporate resources 
makes Japan’s transformation all the more difficult.  The challenge of today’s economic 
policy is to create  an  innovation-friendly environment, where  efficient and flexible 
markets  --conducive to  utilizing the best globally available  resources  and  turning 
innovations into business-- are in place.  In addition, regulatory reform is needed to 
eliminate policy interventions that keep nonviable businesses alive and hinder business   31
innovation.  Consistent messages have to be sent that good performance will be 
rewarded.  And more fundamentally, the Japanese economic and social system needs to 
become open and attractive to foreigners as well as its own people in order to capitalize 
on globally available competitive resources.   
 
Building Capacity to Gain from Asia 
Japan’s future economic prospects fundamentally depend on its capacity to gain from 
new opportunities arising from Asian development.  Businesses can substantially 
enhance their competitiveness by capitalizing on close and abundant, cheap labor and 
other strengths available in the region by focusing on higher value-added activities that 
can be sold globally, including in rapidly growing regional markets.  Consumers will gain 
from lower prices.  Regional developing economies can enjoy stronger growth thanks to 
increased export to Japan and, in turn, provide larger markets for Japan.    
The d ual structure  as  described above, however,  conflicts with Japan’s deeper 
integration with Asia.    It led to a contradictory policy of promoting  Asian 
industrialization through substantial official development assistance (ODA) as well as 
encouraging external investment on the one hand, and, on the other hand, of 
discouraging cheap imports in sensitive sectors through the imposition of quotas and 
high tariffs.  Conscious policy initiatives to promote East Asian economic integration 
must urge Japan to face this issue of sensitive sectors as described in the previous 
section.   
In addition, increased interaction of people and information will put pressure on 
Japan to eliminate lingering sources of mistrust with its neighbors, despite its peaceful 
national policy and economic contributions to the region as well as the global community 
throughout the post-WWII era.  As discussed in the previous section, Japan will be 
required to clarify and articulate its national strategy and the role it is willing to play in   32
the region, one that is widely supported by its people.  Whether Japan can overcome this 
historic challenge  and whether its people can regain a healthy sense of pride and 
confidence in their own country, one that corresponds with its neighbors’ respect and 
trust, will have a large impact on psychological health and vitality of its citizens and 
thus its quality and attractiveness as a society, which will fundamentally affect Japan’s 
capacity to gain from Asia. 
 
FTAs as a Vehicle of Reform 
The policy measures to deal with the new economic environment discussed above 
could have stronger public support since competitive pressure is widely felt among 
Japanese people.  More and more Japanese know that they cannot afford to pay the cost 
of protecting  “sanctuaries” forever.  Focused efforts to liberalize  “sanctuaries” with 
relatively weak resistance have a larger chance of success than before.   
One such example was the Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement 
(JSEPA).  It was natural that Japan negotiated its first FTA with Singapore, which does 
not have many sensitive exports to begin with.  Instead of just avoiding the problem, 
however, Japan capitalized on this situation to  create a pinhole in the barrier 
surrounding “sanctuaries.”  Japan eliminated tariffs on items such as petrochemical and 
textile products, then difficult to liberalize.  Unlike what many critics claim, JSEPA does 
not exclude the agriculture, fishery and forestry sectors.  Japan agreed to bind 0% tariffs 
on items in these sectors (typically considered as “sanctuaries”) whose tariffs are already 
0% on a de facto basis but not bound by its WTO commitments.  This was the first step to 
break the norm of treating these three sectors as “sanctuaries” and to start item-by-item 
considerations.   
The second country with whom Tokyo officially began considering an FTA was 
Mexico, a non-Asian country.  The rationale behind this choice was to overcome   33
discrimination caused by NAFTA and the EU-Mexico FTA, combined with Mexico’s high 
tariffs on a most-favored-nation (MFN) basis.  With real damage visible, inability to 
eliminate tariffs needed for an FTA has high costs in the eyes of the public.  In addition, 
Mexican produce is relatively complementary rather than competitive with Japanese 
produce.  Therefore, on balance, there seems to be a chance of success.  
The third country is Korea, which actually has always been first priority.  It is 
located right next to Japan, and both are U.S. allies and OECD members.  There is a 
desire to focus on common interests and to overcome historical antagonism.  Incidentally, 
neither has a very competitive agricultural sector.  
While it is not clear whether Japan can eventually succeed in these cases, it is fair to 
say that the process is carefully designed so that no particular challenge is too 
overwhelming or politically sensitive, but instead is highly rewarding, so that political 
resistance can be overcome.  The successful experience of relatively easy reforms would 
change expectations and open up opportunities for more difficult reforms down the road. 
At the same time, efforts were made to incorporate a wide range of innovative policy 
measures to reduce transaction costs between the two countries into the JSEPA.6  The 
creative process of designing the JSEPA gave Japanese officials new confidence that a 
focused process would enable them to identify specific problems and practical solutions 
as well as to learn from the countries, with whom they negotiate, about their policy “best 
practices”, the unique challenges of transforming economic and social structures as they 
become more developed and exposed to pressure of globalization, and their aspirations 
as well as perceptions and expectations for Japan and the region as a whole.  This 
                                                   
6 Salient features of the agreement between Japan and Singapore include mutual 
recognition of technical conformity assessment for electrical and electronic products and 
telecommunications equipment, customs cooperation to improve customs procedure 
through more extensive IT use, legal recognition of certified digital signature in both 
countries, mutual recognition of IT skills certification, and facilitation of movement of 
business persons. (Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Singapore for a 
New-Age Economic Partnership (JSEPA))    34
experience had a tremendous psychological effect on those officials, giving them a sense 
of achievement, opening up new ways of thinking about trade and economic policy, and 
energizing them to move forward.   
Thus, concluding an FTA or economic partnership agreement (EPA)7 is essentially a 
process of  self-initiated opening up as opposed to exposure to  traditional external 
pressure, or gaiatsu, since Japan has to choose which countries to conclude FTAs with 
and their contents.  JSEPA was just the first step for Japan.  It is considering EPAs with 
Mexico, Korea and ASEAN.  It is hoped that these EPAs will actually bring about 
much-needed reform momentum in Japan.  At the same time, FTAs and EPAs have 
flexibility that nicely complement the WTO, and thus enriches  Japan’s  trade and 
economic policy.  In summary, FTAs or EPAs will urge Japan to focus on its relations 
with  its neighbors and gradually help it prepare to play a more consistent role to 
contribute to prosperity and stability in Asia. 
 
 
IV.  Implications for U.S. Policy in Asia 
Having assessed the prospect of Asian economic integration, in view of underlying 
forces as well as perceived obstacles, what are the implications for U.S. policy for Asia?   
 
U.S. Membership Not the Dividing Line 
Since the EAEC proposal met strong U .S. objections, the criteria to d etermine 
whether regional frameworks are in the U.S. interest or not has been whether the 
United States was included or not.  Those frameworks without the United States have 
been regarded as “exclusive.”  U.S. reactions to Asian regional frameworks, however, are 
                                                   
7 Japanese policy makers refer to economic partnership agreement as “FTA+” or 
agreements with broader scope that could potentially cover the entire economic systems 
as opposed to something that covers just border measure or so-called “trade-related”   35
quickly changing.  At least, the Bush Administration seems to face the reality of the 
trend toward institutionalizing economic integration in Asia and to actively and 
effectively engage itself in the trend, rather than trying to criticize from outside and 
hinder developments in Asia.  U.S. Trade Representative, Robert B. Zoellick, reportedly 
made a positive comment on ASEAN’s intention to promote a free trade area with Japan, 
South Korea and China, saying the Bush Administration favored promoting free trade 
bilaterally, regionally and globally.8  This change in Washington’s approach may have 
been caused by the fact that ASEAN + 3 was created despite its objection to EAEC and 
subsequent warnings against possible “exclusive” regional arrangements in Asia.   
 
U.S. Interest in East Asian Economic Integration 
More fundamentally, however, Washington has a clear interest in helping East Asia 
become more mature and integrated via regional frameworks regardless of U .S. 
membership.  Here are some reasons: 
 
1) Japan’s economic prospects hinge on Asian economic dynamism 
First, as noted in the previous section,  Japan’s future economic prospects 
substantially depend on its capability to benefit from East Asian economic dynamism.  It 
is in the interest  of the U nited  States  to encourage Japan to proactively take up 
competitive challenges from Asia and to promote reform of its economic structure so that 
it can build its capacity to turn Asian challenges into new opportunities. 
 
2) Interdependence reduces tension and U.S. security burden 
Second, as was described in section II, there are competitive tensions and anxiety 
                                                                                                                                                     
measures. 
8 “Thailand, US mull steps to bilateral arrangement, Zoellick talks of ‘building blocks’” 
April 5, 2002, Bangkok Post, April 5, 2002   36
about each other’s strategic intentions among Asian regional powers.  Economic 
integration that started without regional institutions, however, has already increased 
business contacts through trade and investment and brought about changes in the 
relations among regional economies.  In addition, the process of institutional 
development  --that is, increased interaction among government officials at various 
levels through series of meetings in multiple forums, focused effort to come up with 
trade and financial arrangements, and domestic political process to authorize them-- all 
have substantially enhanced mutual understanding between governments and people in 
general.  With adequate institutional frameworks to promote economic integration, 
cross-border flow of not just goods and capital, but also people, services and information 
(including ideas and culture) will further accelerate this process.  Economic integration 
will engage regional powers in stable regional interdependence where one's prosperity is 
in the interest of others, and make them more predictable and reliable to each other.  
Successful development of poorer countries in Asia through integration in regional 
economic dynamism will help political stability and reduce the possibility that these 
countries will become hotbeds of terrorism.  East Asian economic integration, thus, will 
help reduce regional tension and lighten America's security burden in the region. 
 
3) Japan as a regional leader will be more valuable as a U.S. ally 
Third, there is a question whether the United States can have confidence in Japan as 
a regional leader.  Since Washington is not yet prepared to accept China as the sole 
leader in Asia, therefore, it needs Japan, its primary ally in Asia, to be one of the leaders 
in any pan-Asian (as opposed to pan-Pacific) framework at this time.   
After World War II, Japan depended on the United States for its security as well as 
diplomatic strategy and focused on economic reconstruction.  Japan was successful in 
rapid economic development and even became regarded as an economic threat in the   37
late 1980s.  On the other hand, due to its constitutional restraint, Japan has failed to 
share the responsibility of preserving regional and global security commensurate with 
its growing economic power.  It has been reactive in dealing with the history problem 
and has failed to face it proactively.  Tokyo has not clearly articulated its security policy, 
as it has been shielded, under the U.S. security umbrella, from direct pressure from its 
neighbors.  This posture breeds suspicion among Japan’s neighbors or frustration with 
Japan, which in turn weakened Tokyo’s political power despite its  active  efforts to 
provide economic assistance to its neighbors.  Regional frameworks without the United 
States will put unique pressure on Japan to deal with the problems it has left behind in 
its post-War history.  Japan, if it becomes more open, embedded, and trusted in the 
region through its efforts to overcome these challenges during the process of regional 
collaboration, can become a more effective and valuable U.S. ally.  Acknowledging and 
encouraging Japan’s leadership in the region is not to reduce U.S. power and influence 
in the region.  Rather, it will enhance the effectiveness of U.S. alliances in dealing with 
diverse threats in post-Cold War Asia.   
 
U.S. Roles in Asian Economic Integration 
With greater confidence  about East Asian regional integration as argued above, 
Washington can take several steps to promote its interests as well as healthy 
developments in Asia.   
The f irst is the global leadership.  Washington should take the initiative in 
strengthening global institutions.  As the only global economic superpower, many hope 
that the United States will lead the world in completing the Doha WTO Agenda and will 
refrain from resorting to protectionist measures in its own trade policy.  It is also 
important that Washington lead efforts to reform international financial organizations 
to give East Asian economies a larger voice, one that corresponds to their increasing   38
significance in the global economy. 
The second is to strengthen key bilateral relations in East Asia.  To capitalize on the 
benefit of economic integration in East Asia, it is important for the United States and 
Japan to strengthen two-way policy coordination in regional affairs.  In addition, stable 
U.S. relations with Japan and China are crucial to fostering broad understanding within 
the United States that Asian integration can promote U.S. interests.  Washington can 
also stimulate Asian integration by pursuing its own bilateral FTAs with economies in 
the region.  As noted above, USTR seems to be on the right track in this regard.   
Third, while Asia is different from Europe in its diversity and geopolitical challenges, 
Washington could play a more active role  just as it helped realize European 
reconciliation and integration after World War II.  For example, Washington can support 
the various building blocks of regional integration that will ultimately form a more 
comprehensive and institutionalized framework for regional integration.  U.S. active 
encouragement for the Japan-South Korea economic partnership arrangement  --a 
significant step forward for two of the world's most important economies and U.S. allies 
who are also divided over painful historical memories-- will give a significant push for 
this bilateral initiative.  Washington can also help accelerate integration within ASEAN.  
At the same time, the United States can encourage Japan to become a more independent 
and responsible ally and, at the same time, to become able to command trust by its 
neighbors by clarifying its security policy and overcoming history issues.  After all, a 
trusted Japan will be the key to reducing political tensions in Asia and an indispensable 
element in the future multilateral security framework in Asia. 
 